Case 1. The Red Web: The struggle between Russia's Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries
by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan
Chapter 10: The Snowden Affair
Group Balalaika
Abstract - John
In this chapter the authors outline the unexpected arrival of Edward Snowden, the world famous Internet whistleblower and thorn in the side of the US administration, against a background of increasing Russian government control over the Internet and how despite Snowden's espousal of the UN's charter of Human Rights and his track record in the West, how silent he was in speaking out against increasing Russian Government measures to control the free flow of information in Russia his country of asylum. They also highlight Putin's deft handling of the affair to further Russian government control of the web.
By 2001 the www had given rise to the global common ground of the internet giants Facebook, Twitter, Google functioning throughout the world. However most of the information was stored in servers located on US soil. Putin wanted servers dealing with Russian traffic to be located on Russian soil where the authorities could access and control this information.
At the start of his third term in the Presidency, May 2012, he appoints a Presidential assistant in charge of Internet issues, Shchegolev. Shortly after a Blacklist of banned sites appears, Google Blogspot appears on it and negotiations are forced. Novaya Gazetta (opposition paper) deluged with hacker traffic.
In February 2013, Youth wing of Putin's Party (United Russia) launch group "Media Guard" who identified "extremist sites" (anything uncomfortable for the Government) and 2,475 pages were shut down.
March 2013, Twitter and Facebook comply with Russian government instruction to close specific accounts. They comply. Neither protested govt censorship.
On June 23rd Edward Snowdon arrived at Sheremetyevo Airport in flight from US authorities who wanted to question him over the leak of millions of people's telephone and internet data from the US and around the world, which he had accessed as a former contractor to the US National Security Agency.
Snowdon explained his actions as a protest against the US government's capabilities "to seize this information without a warrant, anywhere, anytime."
He garnered the support of Human Rights organizations and a campaign around the globe was begun to re-examine the issues of digital freedoms and surveillance.
Co-opting independent human rights watchdogs, the Kremlin staged a press conference at the airport in July to hear and support Snowdon's appeal for Russian asylum, subsequently granted on August 1st.
Putin able to present himself as a defender of freedom and the only world leader strong enough to defy the US.
Snowdon's disclosures that US authorities could access the data of Russian citizens strengthened the Kremlin's argument in favour of Russian-based servers so that they would be subject to Russian law (and FSB access).
Snowdon remained silent on the subject of the Russian governments moves to control the internet.
August 2013, new guidelines issued to force companies to store information for twelve hours until it could be retrieved by the authorities affecting Gmail, Yahoo and Instant Messaging. Effected March 2015
April 2014: Putin deftly fielded a call from Snowdon on public live TV about internet censorship insisting everything done in Russia would be according to the law. It was hoped debate would ensue but it didn't.
In May 2014, "Bloggers Law" forced any blogger with a following of more than three thousand followers had to register with the government, no anonymity and six months records on Russian soil as well.
This was the first legislative step to force global social media to relocate servers to Russian soil. Twitter and Facebook "studied" the law.
Russian authorities then attacked the Maidan Ukrainian uprising directly on Twitter.
Then Twitter itself came under fire-for "promoting the interests of the US"
Twitter responded by blocking the a/cs of a radical Ukrainian nationalist party.
In July the State Duma tabled legislation that would prohibit storage of Russian's personal data anywhere but in Russia itself. Global internet providers would have until September 2015 to relocate their servers to Russia.
Finally, Google, Twitter and Fbook sent high-ranking representatives to Moscow, under enormous pressure to buckle to Russian demands.
However, it was much trumpeted in Russia that in August Apple began to store personal user data on Chinese soil.
Snowdon's aspiration to fight for internet freedom in the US and around the world seemed to except the very country he was in.
Questions
(Balalaika-Ch. 10) - Justin
Key Concepts
Prepared by Emily Cote
1. Having Internet servers in Russia has been a decades-long goal for Putin. If the servers were in Russia, they would therefore not be in the United States, which would allow Russia to have control over data and what its citizens were able to view online.
2. Russia has been successful at gaining control over the Internet by way blacklisting websites that do not comply with their wishes and passing new laws to gain further access to Russian data. Websites such as Twitter and Facebook have been forced to delete pages of Russian opponents under threat of having their entire platform blacklisted in Russia. Further, laws like the one passed by the Duma in July 2014 that prohibited the storage of Russian users’ data anywhere but Russia have been used to fulfill Putin’s desire to censor what is available in Russia.
3. Edward Snowden’s arrival in Russia in June 2013 legitimized Putin’s demands to bring servers to Russia. Snowden had revealed the flaws within American surveillance, such as full-scale spying on its own citizens. Putin could not only use this argument to support Russia gaining control, but also could use Snowden’s decision to travel to Russia as proof that Russia was superior to the United States in terms of freedom for its citizens.
Chapter 11: Putin's Overseas Offensive
Abstract for Sputnik Politburo
Prepared by Nicolas
This chapter focuses on the control of the Internet by sovereign states (particularly Russia) and the development of Russian thought on the subject. It discusses at length the attempts at changing the international norm from one of free communication to one of state control. Essentially, the Russian government sees the Internet as a battleground for information where potential threats exists and must be contained or defeated. This is opposed by the US view that the Internet is a mean of communication meant to be relatively free of policing and censorship. Two agencies are in the center of the debate between Russia and the US: ICANN and the ITU. ICANN is a private company based in California whose role is to index and assign all web addresses around the world. Because of its location, Russian officials perceive that it effectively puts the “control” of the Internet solely in American hands. In contrast, The ITU is a UN controlled organization which has been historically overseeing international norm for telecommunication (until 2012, it had no specific responsibility over the Internet). After two failed proposed treaties by Russia to the US to strip ICANN of its power, Russian efforts shifted towards the expansion of the ITU’s mandate to create an international norm of control over the Internet. This shift was made possible because of the pro-Russian leanings of the ITU chairman. Ultimately, none of these attempts proved successful for Russia as the Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries refused to endorse the changes proposed by Russia. In 2013, the Snowden leaks renewed the interest for stricter control of the Internet, however nations were unwilling to do so multilaterally and rather examined national or regional proposals instead.
Chapter 12: Watch Your Back
This chapter focuses on the 2014 Sochi Winter Games, the increase in electronic surveillance measures put in place by the FSB and the implications it had for the future. In Sochi, there was government mandated systematic use of SORM equipment (Russian system of communication interception). Other security measures included drones, sonars and a vast and complex system of ID tracking and credentials collection. During the build-up to the games the bombing of the Boston marathon and two bombings in Volgograd contributed to make the public (and tourists) more tolerant of electronic surveillance. In a surprise move, after an exposé on electronic surveillance of the games in The Guardian newspaper, the Russian government did not deny the scale of the operation put in place for the Sochi games. In fact, the author of the chapter surmises that this was an attempt by FSB at intimidation by using the KGB tactic of “open-surveillance”. The effectiveness of that tactic is disputed since, bloggers, the press and protesters were all successfully active during that period. The final concern of the author is that all the data and metadata collected over the Sochi games on people from all over the world, might be used by the Russian government for years to come.
Questions for Sputnik Politburo - Ashley
Chapter 13: The Big Red Button
Abstract for Cheburashka Politburo
Prepared by Victoria
When the Sochi Olympics ended, Russia's President Putin was beginning to sense dissent coming from Ukraine, as its President was missing and there were small acts of protest toward the Ukraine's Soviet roots. This sparked a military campaign in Crimea and propaganda campaign in the whole of Ukraine by the Russian government. The intent was to spark a nationalist, pro-Russia movement within the Ukraine and to slander the separatists as "fascists". The most significant part of the propaganda was the manner in which the Russian government used the internet to promote and censor information regarding the movement to be in favour of Russia. Their first move was to block 13 pages on Russian social media advocating for the Ukrainian protests, and establish pro-nationalist web pages. The Russian government soon turned to media intimidation tactics, threatening Russian news website "Lenta.ru". They continued to block independent opposition blogs and websites, citing them as "extremist". These actions by the Russian government led the media and journalism community that was being censored to hold a meeting and figure out a course of action they could take to get their message and information out by bypassing the censors of the Russian government. The initial solution to the blacklisting of the websites was to provide their readers with links for tools on how to bypass the censors of the government, in which they included links to help them evade the blacklists. Finally, a better solution was found by Rusan Leviev, a computer programmer. He created a tool to re-route users through a number of domains that evade the government's blacklisting efforts. The final push by the Russian government to censor the media was to go beyond their borders and censor websites that were from other countries such as Buzzfeed, German newspaper websites, and eventually they went as far as censoring parts of Facebook.
Questions for Cheburashka Politburo
Prepared by Hailey
Key Points
Prepared by Chris Wieczorek
1. “As soon as the [Ukraine] crisis began, the Russian authorities tightened control of information online. Since 2012 the Kremlin had been actively building mechanism and tools of control of the internet, and the moment came to test their effectiveness” (Chapter 13, p. 2). Two ideas here – firstly, Russia proactively clamped down on information online as soon as they invaded Ukraine, making it harder for any dissent to even get off the ground. Secondly, online censorship hasn’t just become fashionable recently; the Kremlin has been planning and experimenting with it for at least a few years now.
2. “When Navalny’s blog on LiveJournal was blocked on March 18, 2014… Leviev came to realize that cooperation with the authorities was pointless” (Chapter 13, p. 8). Whereas the journalism and online community previously had a quasi-working relationship with the Kremlin, they now found that the authorities were unwilling to listen to them. With their websites and news channels censored, the opposition media was forced to find creative alternative ways to distribute their information to the Russian populace.
3. “The video was removed not by Buzzfeed, but by Google, which owns YouTube. This was an important victory for Roskomnadzor, marking the first time the agency openly and shamelessly blocked foreign websites for expressing political views in Russia” (Chapter 13, p. 16) Not only the department heavily censor Russian websites and content within Russia, but also expands to (at least attempting) to censor content by created by foreign websites in Russia, or even content on foreign websites, such as the Ukrainian news site glavkom.ua. Relative acquiescence of foreign companies and media sources to block/censor their own content when requested to by the Russian government is also concerning.
4. “Authorities who sought to block, filter and censor simply did not know what to do with the forces behind the ‘big red button’” (Chapter 13, p. 17-18). Although censor of ‘traditional’ media appears to be quite effective organizers and activists in the online community are able to bypass the censors on a regular basis, constantly hiding or changing their tactics to avoid censorship by the authorities.
Chapter 14 (Moscow's Long Shadow) & 15 (Information Runs Free)
Abstract for Kremlin
Prepared by Thomas
The internet has become an important battlefield for the Russian government and Vladimir Putin. On the internet, the Russian government tries to spread its own message and counter narratives it dislikes. For Vladimir Putin, this fight seeks to advance both his domestic and foreign policy objectives.
The importance of the internet to Russia’s foreign policy can be seen in the start of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. A Ukrainian journalist, Mustafa Nayyem, called for opponents of Victor Yanukovych to organize in Independence Square. Mustafa was frustrated that President Yanukovych had backed out of an agreement with the European Union. Yanukovych had changed course because of pressure from Vladimir Putin. Russia has been fiercely opposed to the expansion of Western Institutions, such as NATO and the EU, into areas that were previously part of the Soviet Union.
Facebook, and other social media websites such as VKontakte, would play a key role in enabling the protesters to organize against the government. Ukrainian protesters could rapidly mobilize and spread information in a way that was difficult for the authorities to control. Online, protesters could report troop movements and make lists of people who had been arrested and were missing.
As the revolution morphed into a civil war and Russian invasion, analysts predicted the Russian government would launch blunt and unsophisticated attacks on Ukrainian digital infrastructure. Instead, it unleashed a troll army on social media to try and influence the narrative surrounding the war. The trolls were paid and organized by the Russian government in factory like settings where they produced posts to attack Russian critics and spread disinformation. The trolls were successful in promoting false stories such as atrocities by Ukrainian fascists in Eastern Ukraine. Documents from one of the troll factories indicate that while the information operations have been successful on Russia’s periphery, they have been less effective in influencing western opinions on the conflict in Ukraine.
Russia has had remarkable success in controlling the media narrative within its borders. It has used strict media laws and intimidation to gain control over almost all of the media that Russians consume. On the internet, Russia made it a priority to dominate VKontakte, a social network popular with Russian speakers. The founder, Pavel Durov, had fought with the government over deleting an anticorruption group on VKontakte organized by Alexey Navalny. Pavel Durov was forced to sell off his share in the company and hand over control to Kremlin loyalists. As a result, other digital companies such as Yandex have fallen into line.
Vladimir Putin has made several implicit threats against internet companies such as supporting the idea of data localization in Russia. One extreme form of internet control that has been proposed in the State Duma is called “Cheburashka” after a character from Russian children’s literature. The proposal would create a domestic internet within Russia completely disconnected from all outside contact. These steps have negatively impacted digital companies in Russia that were a small bright spot in an otherwise struggling economy.
Even with its tight controls, information continues to escape. In a delightful twist of irony, Russian soldiers repeatedly posted pictures of themselves fighting in Ukraine on VKontakte. Journalists have used this information to prove Russia’s direct involvement in the fighting in Eastern Ukraine, despite Russian claims to the contrary.
Questions Kremlin Politburo
Prepared by Takdeer
Key concepts
Prepared by Rose
by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan
Chapter 10: The Snowden Affair
Group Balalaika
Abstract - John
In this chapter the authors outline the unexpected arrival of Edward Snowden, the world famous Internet whistleblower and thorn in the side of the US administration, against a background of increasing Russian government control over the Internet and how despite Snowden's espousal of the UN's charter of Human Rights and his track record in the West, how silent he was in speaking out against increasing Russian Government measures to control the free flow of information in Russia his country of asylum. They also highlight Putin's deft handling of the affair to further Russian government control of the web.
By 2001 the www had given rise to the global common ground of the internet giants Facebook, Twitter, Google functioning throughout the world. However most of the information was stored in servers located on US soil. Putin wanted servers dealing with Russian traffic to be located on Russian soil where the authorities could access and control this information.
At the start of his third term in the Presidency, May 2012, he appoints a Presidential assistant in charge of Internet issues, Shchegolev. Shortly after a Blacklist of banned sites appears, Google Blogspot appears on it and negotiations are forced. Novaya Gazetta (opposition paper) deluged with hacker traffic.
In February 2013, Youth wing of Putin's Party (United Russia) launch group "Media Guard" who identified "extremist sites" (anything uncomfortable for the Government) and 2,475 pages were shut down.
March 2013, Twitter and Facebook comply with Russian government instruction to close specific accounts. They comply. Neither protested govt censorship.
On June 23rd Edward Snowdon arrived at Sheremetyevo Airport in flight from US authorities who wanted to question him over the leak of millions of people's telephone and internet data from the US and around the world, which he had accessed as a former contractor to the US National Security Agency.
Snowdon explained his actions as a protest against the US government's capabilities "to seize this information without a warrant, anywhere, anytime."
He garnered the support of Human Rights organizations and a campaign around the globe was begun to re-examine the issues of digital freedoms and surveillance.
Co-opting independent human rights watchdogs, the Kremlin staged a press conference at the airport in July to hear and support Snowdon's appeal for Russian asylum, subsequently granted on August 1st.
Putin able to present himself as a defender of freedom and the only world leader strong enough to defy the US.
Snowdon's disclosures that US authorities could access the data of Russian citizens strengthened the Kremlin's argument in favour of Russian-based servers so that they would be subject to Russian law (and FSB access).
Snowdon remained silent on the subject of the Russian governments moves to control the internet.
August 2013, new guidelines issued to force companies to store information for twelve hours until it could be retrieved by the authorities affecting Gmail, Yahoo and Instant Messaging. Effected March 2015
April 2014: Putin deftly fielded a call from Snowdon on public live TV about internet censorship insisting everything done in Russia would be according to the law. It was hoped debate would ensue but it didn't.
In May 2014, "Bloggers Law" forced any blogger with a following of more than three thousand followers had to register with the government, no anonymity and six months records on Russian soil as well.
This was the first legislative step to force global social media to relocate servers to Russian soil. Twitter and Facebook "studied" the law.
Russian authorities then attacked the Maidan Ukrainian uprising directly on Twitter.
Then Twitter itself came under fire-for "promoting the interests of the US"
Twitter responded by blocking the a/cs of a radical Ukrainian nationalist party.
In July the State Duma tabled legislation that would prohibit storage of Russian's personal data anywhere but in Russia itself. Global internet providers would have until September 2015 to relocate their servers to Russia.
Finally, Google, Twitter and Fbook sent high-ranking representatives to Moscow, under enormous pressure to buckle to Russian demands.
However, it was much trumpeted in Russia that in August Apple began to store personal user data on Chinese soil.
Snowdon's aspiration to fight for internet freedom in the US and around the world seemed to except the very country he was in.
Questions
(Balalaika-Ch. 10) - Justin
- Why would Edward Snowden, a man who put himself in danger by speaking out against American abuses of private information, decide to seek refuge in Russia, a country that is perhaps even more blatant than the US in its usage of private information for such purposes as threats and intimidation?
- Do you think that Edward Snowden is being held against his will in order to be used to benefit Russian political goals, or is he safely and voluntarily enjoying asylum in Russia?
- Do you think that Vladimir Putin would be likely to surrender Snowden to the US as some sort of political favour/act of goodwill in the future?
- Is the presidency of Donald Trump and his attitude towards Putin and Russia likely to alter Snowden’s future outlook?
- Is it fair for countries to exercise “internet sovereignty,” i.e. the right to demand that the online information of their citizens be stored on data servers physically located within their borders?
- Can internet censorship of such things as websites and social media accounts be used to combat terrorism and extremism? If so, should it be used?
Key Concepts
Prepared by Emily Cote
1. Having Internet servers in Russia has been a decades-long goal for Putin. If the servers were in Russia, they would therefore not be in the United States, which would allow Russia to have control over data and what its citizens were able to view online.
2. Russia has been successful at gaining control over the Internet by way blacklisting websites that do not comply with their wishes and passing new laws to gain further access to Russian data. Websites such as Twitter and Facebook have been forced to delete pages of Russian opponents under threat of having their entire platform blacklisted in Russia. Further, laws like the one passed by the Duma in July 2014 that prohibited the storage of Russian users’ data anywhere but Russia have been used to fulfill Putin’s desire to censor what is available in Russia.
3. Edward Snowden’s arrival in Russia in June 2013 legitimized Putin’s demands to bring servers to Russia. Snowden had revealed the flaws within American surveillance, such as full-scale spying on its own citizens. Putin could not only use this argument to support Russia gaining control, but also could use Snowden’s decision to travel to Russia as proof that Russia was superior to the United States in terms of freedom for its citizens.
Chapter 11: Putin's Overseas Offensive
Abstract for Sputnik Politburo
Prepared by Nicolas
This chapter focuses on the control of the Internet by sovereign states (particularly Russia) and the development of Russian thought on the subject. It discusses at length the attempts at changing the international norm from one of free communication to one of state control. Essentially, the Russian government sees the Internet as a battleground for information where potential threats exists and must be contained or defeated. This is opposed by the US view that the Internet is a mean of communication meant to be relatively free of policing and censorship. Two agencies are in the center of the debate between Russia and the US: ICANN and the ITU. ICANN is a private company based in California whose role is to index and assign all web addresses around the world. Because of its location, Russian officials perceive that it effectively puts the “control” of the Internet solely in American hands. In contrast, The ITU is a UN controlled organization which has been historically overseeing international norm for telecommunication (until 2012, it had no specific responsibility over the Internet). After two failed proposed treaties by Russia to the US to strip ICANN of its power, Russian efforts shifted towards the expansion of the ITU’s mandate to create an international norm of control over the Internet. This shift was made possible because of the pro-Russian leanings of the ITU chairman. Ultimately, none of these attempts proved successful for Russia as the Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries refused to endorse the changes proposed by Russia. In 2013, the Snowden leaks renewed the interest for stricter control of the Internet, however nations were unwilling to do so multilaterally and rather examined national or regional proposals instead.
Chapter 12: Watch Your Back
This chapter focuses on the 2014 Sochi Winter Games, the increase in electronic surveillance measures put in place by the FSB and the implications it had for the future. In Sochi, there was government mandated systematic use of SORM equipment (Russian system of communication interception). Other security measures included drones, sonars and a vast and complex system of ID tracking and credentials collection. During the build-up to the games the bombing of the Boston marathon and two bombings in Volgograd contributed to make the public (and tourists) more tolerant of electronic surveillance. In a surprise move, after an exposé on electronic surveillance of the games in The Guardian newspaper, the Russian government did not deny the scale of the operation put in place for the Sochi games. In fact, the author of the chapter surmises that this was an attempt by FSB at intimidation by using the KGB tactic of “open-surveillance”. The effectiveness of that tactic is disputed since, bloggers, the press and protesters were all successfully active during that period. The final concern of the author is that all the data and metadata collected over the Sochi games on people from all over the world, might be used by the Russian government for years to come.
Questions for Sputnik Politburo - Ashley
- What was the main difference in the way that the United States and Russia viewed the potential use of the internet?
- Why did Russia want to strip ICANN of its power?
- What did Russia propose as an alternative to an open and unrestricted internet? How is this implemented today?
- Which UN controlled organization did Russia align itself with? Why?
- What information gathering methods were branded as “technological advancements” for the Sochi games?
- What was surprising about the Russian Authority’s response to The Global and other western media reporting about surveillance?
- What was the author’s closing concerns?
Chapter 13: The Big Red Button
Abstract for Cheburashka Politburo
Prepared by Victoria
When the Sochi Olympics ended, Russia's President Putin was beginning to sense dissent coming from Ukraine, as its President was missing and there were small acts of protest toward the Ukraine's Soviet roots. This sparked a military campaign in Crimea and propaganda campaign in the whole of Ukraine by the Russian government. The intent was to spark a nationalist, pro-Russia movement within the Ukraine and to slander the separatists as "fascists". The most significant part of the propaganda was the manner in which the Russian government used the internet to promote and censor information regarding the movement to be in favour of Russia. Their first move was to block 13 pages on Russian social media advocating for the Ukrainian protests, and establish pro-nationalist web pages. The Russian government soon turned to media intimidation tactics, threatening Russian news website "Lenta.ru". They continued to block independent opposition blogs and websites, citing them as "extremist". These actions by the Russian government led the media and journalism community that was being censored to hold a meeting and figure out a course of action they could take to get their message and information out by bypassing the censors of the Russian government. The initial solution to the blacklisting of the websites was to provide their readers with links for tools on how to bypass the censors of the government, in which they included links to help them evade the blacklists. Finally, a better solution was found by Rusan Leviev, a computer programmer. He created a tool to re-route users through a number of domains that evade the government's blacklisting efforts. The final push by the Russian government to censor the media was to go beyond their borders and censor websites that were from other countries such as Buzzfeed, German newspaper websites, and eventually they went as far as censoring parts of Facebook.
Questions for Cheburashka Politburo
Prepared by Hailey
- What are the similarities between the censorship employed by the Roskomnadzor in 2014 and the methods employed Soviet Union?
- What could have been the associated causes of the shift from mild cooperation to extreme opposition between the liberal media and the government?
- What point did Soldotov and Borogan seek to make in mentioning the Roskomnadzor working outside the Russian borders to take down sites they deemed extremist?
- If Canadian news channels were shut down only to be found online for a fee, do you think citizens would manage to inform themselves? Why or why not?
- Was the Russian censorship able to limit the possibility for online revolutionaries to provoke real-world revolutionary actions? Was this a danger in the first place or was this unnecessary?
- This chapter seeks to explain the horizontal nature of online networks. How does decentralization pose as a threat to governments who wish to silence a revolutionary rhetoric in the future? Is possible to censor such a group in a highly technologized world?
Key Points
Prepared by Chris Wieczorek
- Russian authorities were originally relative successful in censoring traditional media sources during and after the Ukraine crisis.
- Authorities had a mind of their own, and were not willing to listen to the publishing/journalism community – necessitated the need for alternative ways to spread information.
- Russian authorities were able to not only censor content within Russia, but also websites and corporations outside of Russia.
- Russian authorities were not able to totally stamp out dissent online, however, as alternative methods and forms of communication were created.
1. “As soon as the [Ukraine] crisis began, the Russian authorities tightened control of information online. Since 2012 the Kremlin had been actively building mechanism and tools of control of the internet, and the moment came to test their effectiveness” (Chapter 13, p. 2). Two ideas here – firstly, Russia proactively clamped down on information online as soon as they invaded Ukraine, making it harder for any dissent to even get off the ground. Secondly, online censorship hasn’t just become fashionable recently; the Kremlin has been planning and experimenting with it for at least a few years now.
2. “When Navalny’s blog on LiveJournal was blocked on March 18, 2014… Leviev came to realize that cooperation with the authorities was pointless” (Chapter 13, p. 8). Whereas the journalism and online community previously had a quasi-working relationship with the Kremlin, they now found that the authorities were unwilling to listen to them. With their websites and news channels censored, the opposition media was forced to find creative alternative ways to distribute their information to the Russian populace.
3. “The video was removed not by Buzzfeed, but by Google, which owns YouTube. This was an important victory for Roskomnadzor, marking the first time the agency openly and shamelessly blocked foreign websites for expressing political views in Russia” (Chapter 13, p. 16) Not only the department heavily censor Russian websites and content within Russia, but also expands to (at least attempting) to censor content by created by foreign websites in Russia, or even content on foreign websites, such as the Ukrainian news site glavkom.ua. Relative acquiescence of foreign companies and media sources to block/censor their own content when requested to by the Russian government is also concerning.
4. “Authorities who sought to block, filter and censor simply did not know what to do with the forces behind the ‘big red button’” (Chapter 13, p. 17-18). Although censor of ‘traditional’ media appears to be quite effective organizers and activists in the online community are able to bypass the censors on a regular basis, constantly hiding or changing their tactics to avoid censorship by the authorities.
Chapter 14 (Moscow's Long Shadow) & 15 (Information Runs Free)
Abstract for Kremlin
Prepared by Thomas
The internet has become an important battlefield for the Russian government and Vladimir Putin. On the internet, the Russian government tries to spread its own message and counter narratives it dislikes. For Vladimir Putin, this fight seeks to advance both his domestic and foreign policy objectives.
The importance of the internet to Russia’s foreign policy can be seen in the start of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. A Ukrainian journalist, Mustafa Nayyem, called for opponents of Victor Yanukovych to organize in Independence Square. Mustafa was frustrated that President Yanukovych had backed out of an agreement with the European Union. Yanukovych had changed course because of pressure from Vladimir Putin. Russia has been fiercely opposed to the expansion of Western Institutions, such as NATO and the EU, into areas that were previously part of the Soviet Union.
Facebook, and other social media websites such as VKontakte, would play a key role in enabling the protesters to organize against the government. Ukrainian protesters could rapidly mobilize and spread information in a way that was difficult for the authorities to control. Online, protesters could report troop movements and make lists of people who had been arrested and were missing.
As the revolution morphed into a civil war and Russian invasion, analysts predicted the Russian government would launch blunt and unsophisticated attacks on Ukrainian digital infrastructure. Instead, it unleashed a troll army on social media to try and influence the narrative surrounding the war. The trolls were paid and organized by the Russian government in factory like settings where they produced posts to attack Russian critics and spread disinformation. The trolls were successful in promoting false stories such as atrocities by Ukrainian fascists in Eastern Ukraine. Documents from one of the troll factories indicate that while the information operations have been successful on Russia’s periphery, they have been less effective in influencing western opinions on the conflict in Ukraine.
Russia has had remarkable success in controlling the media narrative within its borders. It has used strict media laws and intimidation to gain control over almost all of the media that Russians consume. On the internet, Russia made it a priority to dominate VKontakte, a social network popular with Russian speakers. The founder, Pavel Durov, had fought with the government over deleting an anticorruption group on VKontakte organized by Alexey Navalny. Pavel Durov was forced to sell off his share in the company and hand over control to Kremlin loyalists. As a result, other digital companies such as Yandex have fallen into line.
Vladimir Putin has made several implicit threats against internet companies such as supporting the idea of data localization in Russia. One extreme form of internet control that has been proposed in the State Duma is called “Cheburashka” after a character from Russian children’s literature. The proposal would create a domestic internet within Russia completely disconnected from all outside contact. These steps have negatively impacted digital companies in Russia that were a small bright spot in an otherwise struggling economy.
Even with its tight controls, information continues to escape. In a delightful twist of irony, Russian soldiers repeatedly posted pictures of themselves fighting in Ukraine on VKontakte. Journalists have used this information to prove Russia’s direct involvement in the fighting in Eastern Ukraine, despite Russian claims to the contrary.
Questions Kremlin Politburo
Prepared by Takdeer
- Why does Putin want to control the internet and more specifically social media, email and internet infrastructure?
- Do you think a free internet is an intrinsic human right? If so, do you think Putin is infringing on the Russian peoples human rights with increased government control over the internet and its subsidiaries?
- Anonymous International publication of troll farms internal reports suggesting that “users in the United States could easily spot the troll campaigns supporting Russia, rendering the postings useless”. Do you agree and if so have you spotted Russian trolls or propaganda while on the internet, social media, blogs or message boards?
- What do you think about the authors continued references to the “Soviet legacy” and Russia especially in surveillance technology such as SORM?
- Do you think the “Red Web” is western propaganda? Who is the audience that the book is targeting and why?
- Why does Pavel Durov sell Vkontake? Do you believe the authors and Durov’s answer?
- Putin claims that America has a monopoly on the internet, why, does he then supposedly follow America in increasing control over the internet?
- Do you agree with Volozh and Dimitry Grishin that Russian internet companies should be left alone, or, is Putin right for increasing government control?
Key concepts
Prepared by Rose
- Social media and telecommunications can be used both by protesters and opposition politicians, as an efficient means of communication, and by the government (both in terms of surveillance of enemies’ and indeed regular citizens’ communication and of the dissemination of false information to create support for the government, especially through scare tactics like the false reports of “fascists” in the Donbass)
- The use of communications technology has been an important strategy for the Russian government since Soviet times, beginning with a form of telesurveillance called SORM, and continues to be so today, now incorporating social media as well as telecommunications (though telesurveillance remains an important strategy) and, since 2014, having taken a turn towards trolling and the dissemination of fake news (in the early 2000s, in contrast, their main strategy was attacking neighbouring countries’ Internet service to make certain websites unusable).
- Surrounding post-Soviet states’ surveillance technologies have been influenced by the shared Soviet past, and many of their telesurveillance technologies (SORM) hence come from Russia. This creates complications when in conflict with Russia; Ukraine’s security agency’s use of SORM technology is one example.
- Another effect of the Soviet past is the difference between the effectiveness of Russian troll programs in Ukraine and within Russia (where they have proven effective) and in the West (where most Internet users can easily spot paid pro-Kremlin trolls as exactly that and not valid sources of information).
- Putin’s approach to the regulation of the Internet is largely informed by (his wish to foment) suspicion of the West/of “foreigners,” especially through claims that America controls the Internet, and this has had a negative impact on Russian Internet developers and on freedom of the Internet in Russia—this despite the fact that Russia’s Internet sector is a very important part of the country’s economy, and a source of pride for many Russians.